Abstract: I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account of value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
possesses and exercises the capacity to recognise lemons from the way they look. This capacity will be manifested in one's tending to take things that look that way to be lemons.
Such a recognitional capacity is subjective in the straightforward sense that it concerns a feature of the subject, viz. that they possess a certain capacity. But this subjective requirement on perceptual knowledge brings with it an objective requirement that must be met by the objects of one's knowledge. This is that there must be regularity to the way they look.
Here we can follow Millar (2000) in distinguishing characteristic from distinctive looks. At a first pass, to say that lemons have a characteristic look is to say that most lemons look a certain way. On the other hand, to say that lemons have a distinctive look is to say that there is a way of looking such that most things looking that way are lemons. In our world, lemons have a look that is both characteristic and distinctive. However, in a world in which lemons are outnumbered by plastic lemon replicas, lemons would have a characteristic look, but not a distinctive look.
To ground perceptual knowledge, recognitional capacities must be responsive to distinctive looks. This ensures reliability and rules out a certain sort of luck.
3 It must be the case that the way things look is a reliable guide to the way they are. So, for example, looking the way that lemons look must be a reliable indication of being a lemon. That is, there must be an l such that most things that look l are lemons.
Suppose that a subject were disposed to take things that looked that way to be limes.
And further suppose that, on a particular occasion, they saw a lime that happened to be yellow. With the distinctive looks condition in place we can maintain that this subject does not see that (and so know that) the lime before her is a lime. She got lucky, and so lacks knowledge, since most limes do not look that way, despite the fact that on this occasion what she sees is a lime. 4 3 As is widely recognised, some forms of luck are compatible with knowledge (Unger 1968; Pritchard 2007: Ch.5) . Although I will not defend it here, I take it to be relatively uncontroversial that the lucky Watkin & Yolandi case discussed in §4 is not so compatible. It is a version of the well-known stopped clock example, and so a case of 'veritic epistemic luck' discussed by Pritchard (2007: Ch.6) . 4 This account might be refined in a number of ways. For example, we might want to set the reliability bar higher than a bare 'most'. For now we can simply use 'most' as
Emotion Recognition
As I will use the phrase, A recognises B's emotional state e when A comes to know, through a face-to-face or analogous encounter, that B is e. For example, upon seeing my daughter's beaming smile, I come to know that she is happy. A natural question to ask is whether such knowledge is ever perceptual?
Philosophers, psychologists, and lay-folk often say something to the effect that one can see emotion in the face. Peter Goldie, for example, claims that, an expression of emotion, such as a facial expression or an intonation of voice
[…] often yield [s] an immediate and highly reliable grasp of another's emotion, and, to a less extent, their mood and character traits. On such occasions it is natural to say that we perceive embarrassment in the blush, fear in the trembling, anguish in the sob, and so forth. (2000: 182) In a later work, he suggests something similar for traits/attitudes such as friendliness, 'one can see the friendliness in an action or in a facial expression; the knowledge that this person is being friendly is perceptual, and not inferential ' (2004: 23) .
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Such perceptual accounts of emotion recognition can be understood in a number of ways. The most obvious distinction is between the claim that A bears the seeing relation to B's emotion, on the one hand, and the claim that A sees that B is e, on the other. The latter, I have suggested, entails that A has (visual) perceptual knowledge of B's emotion. This will be my focus.
6 a technical term defined as that proportion, whatever it is, required for one's recognitional capacities to reliably deliver truth. Of course, this raises the question of what we mean by 'reliable', but that issue can wait. 5 Also see (Dretske 1973; McDowell 1982; Cassam 2007: Ch.5; Green 2007; Green 2010; Smith 2010 , Smith 2013 McNeill 2012) . 6 As Peter Goldie recognised, a perceptual account alone is likely to account for only the most elementary of knowledge of another's emotional state, for example that they are happy or afraid (cf. Goldie 1999 Common-sense surely tells us that both DL e and RC e are satisfied, at least for the so-called 'basic' emotions of joy, surprise, fear, anger, disgust and sadness (Ekman & Davidson 1994: Part I) . We typically suppose that there are indeed distinctive ways that joyous, surprised, fearful, angry, disgusted, and sad people look. These ways will include certain typical bodily postures and, perhaps most strikingly, certain facial expressions: joyous people smile, angry people frown, and so on.
Further, we typically suppose that competent observers are usually adept at recognising when, say, a person is joyous from the way they look (e.g. when they smile). Putting these together, it is entirely in keeping with common sense that, in at least some cases, we take others to be, say, happy in virtue of exercising a capacity to recognise happy people from the distinctive way they smile. Adapting a well-known phrase of Wittgenstein's (1953: Part II, §iv) , the human face is the best picture of the human soul. liable to require justified beliefs about the expresser's character, etc. Whilst this point is closely related to the issue of context discussed below, I will not pursue it here. 7 Note that whilst this is a perceptual account of emotion recognition, it does not require that emotions themselves be perceptually manifest. That is, it does not require, although it does allow, that the ways that people look include their emotional states themselves. I argue for this stronger claim about the visual manifestation of some emotional states in (Smith, 2013) .
In addition to being a part of common sense, this account accords with a well established tradition in the psychology of emotion. This tradition arguably begins with Darwin's (1872) ground-breaking work but really only became an established, in fact arguably the standard, view in the latter half of the Twentieth Century with the work of Tomkins, Friesen, Izard, and Ekman (see, for example Ekman et al., 1972; Ekman 1972 ). Summarising Ekman's 'Neurocultural' version of this position, basic emotions are pan-cultural 'affect programmes', automatically triggering particular facial expressions which can be overridden only by culturally varied 'display rules'.
These stereotypical facial expressions are universally recognised and associated with their particular basic emotion. As a notable example, the Duchenne smile is the universally recognised indicator of joy and is often claimed to be impossible, or at least very difficult, to fake (Ekman & Friesen 1982) .
This view, it would seem, lends some support to both DL e and RC e . Keeping with the example of joy, it supports the view that the look of someone exhibiting a Duchenne smile is distinctive of joy, and the claim that competent observers can recognise joyous people on the basis of their looking that way.
In addition, the Neurocultural view can answer a worry about whether DL e and RC e cohere in exactly the right way. Ways things look, the values of l, can be more or less determinate. For example, a banana looks yellow, but it also looks a particular shade of yellow; a Duchenne smile involves certain specific muscle actions (specifically, the zygomatic major and the orbiculari oculis), but of course no two smiles look exactly alike. It is important, given the general account of perceptual knowledge that I am sketching, that the determinacy of l is not significantly lower in RC e than in DL e . For if only a certain very determinate look, l 1 , were distinctive of fs, yet the typical observer's powers of discrimination were not so fine, effectively classing everything looking l 1 -l n as f, then reliability would be threatened. The
Neurocultural view provides some reason to think that this possibility is not realised.
The Duchenne smile, for example, is specified at a level of determinacy not so high as to be indiscriminable to a competent observer. Indeed, it is quite natural to suppose that the production and recognition of stereotypical facial expressions have coevolved (Fridlund 1994; Jack et al., 2012 ).
The Neurocultural view, then, supports the common-sense picture of some emotions-the basic ones-possessing looks that are both characteristic and distinctive and to which we are sensitive in our recognitional capacities. As such, it goes some way towards supporting the proposition that at least some cases of emotion recognition satisfy two necessary conditions on perceptual knowledge. This is a highly attractive package combining, as it does, an intuitive account of perceptual knowledge, a common-sense picture of emotion recognition and a significant body of supporting empirical work.
Value Recognition
As I will use the phrase, A recognises o's evaluative property v when A comes to know, through a perceptual or analogous encounter, that o possesses v. Here I assume a broad understanding of evaluative properties to include, for example, being cruel, being offensive, being threatening, being appropriate, etc. So, for example, upon seeing someone pull the wings from a fly, I may come to know that that action was cruel.
8 As with the case of emotion recognition, we can ask whether such knowledge is ever perceptual.
A number of philosophers have recently argued that it is. Concerning an example in which Jack sees Mary being teased, Peter Goldie asks, 'Can Jack see that
Mary is upset and about to cry, and that this fact, evaluated in this situation, is a reason for him to change the subject? ' (2007: 350) , answering in the affirmative.
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This example-in Goldie's terms, a case of seeing what is the kind thing to do-is complex, involving the situation as a whole calling for a certain course of action, and much of Goldie's account consists in teasing apart some of this complexity. But
Goldie's example might also be thought to support the simpler case in which Jack sees that the teasing of Mary is cruel. Here we have a perceived action instantiating a thick evaluative property. Because of their relative simplicity, I shall focus on cases of this sort.
As with the case of emotion recognition, a perceptual account of value recognition can be construed as involving the following two necessary conditions, 8 In speaking of value recognition in this way I am presupposing that there exist values to be known. This is obviously a non-trivial assumption, but I could not possibly defend it here. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity' (McDowell 1979: 331-332) . If this is correct-if both DL v and RC v are satisfied-then according the account of perceptual knowledge outlined in §1, we will be in a position to defend the claim that some knowledge of evaluative facts is perceptual.
The explanation of looks
The account that I have been working with takes the distinctive looks and recognitional capacities conditions to be necessary for perceptual knowledge. There is some reason, however, to suppose that they are not jointly sufficient. 10 This is for the reason that whilst the account of perceptual knowledge, and so both emotion and value recognition, is intended to secure knowledge from luck, its success on this score 10 Indeed, one may be sceptical of the project of providing sufficient conditions on the possession of knowledge (Williamson 2000 A second, non-luck based, reason to doubt that the two conditions, DL e and RC e, are jointly sufficient is that, if they were, every way an object looks would potentially ground knowledge of certain necessary truths. For any l it is true that most things that look l are either f or not-f, for any f. It would then be possible, implausibly, to gain knowledge via vision that some object is either f or not-f.
It is relatively easy to avoid these consequences by introducing another necessary condition on perceptual knowledge to the effect that the way the perceived object looks is appropriately explained by the way it is. 11 That is, for S to see that o is f from the way, l, o looks, it must be that o looks l because it is f. 12 Applying this to the case of emotion recognition, we will say that in order for someone to see that another is, say, happy from the observation of their Duchenne smile, it must be the case that they are smiling because they are happy. Whilst I leave this 'because' 11 This is not the only response possible, of course. For example, one might argue that one or other safety condition (very roughly: knowledge that P requires that in nearby worlds in which one forms the same belief in the same way, P is true) protects It is reasonably plausible to suppose that in a range of cases, this condition is met. When I see that that is yellow from the way it looks (i.e. yellow), it is the case that it looks that way because it is yellow. When I see that it is a lemon from the way it looks (i.e. yellow and lemon-shaped), it looks that way because it is a lemon. When I see that a person is amused from the way they look (i.e. exhibiting a Duchenne smile in an appropriate context), they look that way because they are amused.
14 What about the case of value recognition? Will this meet this 'explanatory connection' condition? I want to suggest that it will not. Actions do not look as they do because they instantiate value properties. Rather, I suggest, the way an act looks is explained by (facts about) the basic visible properties (shapes, colours, etc.) of the agent, the patient, and the surrounding environment. Those facts will, I assume, be explained by further facts about the agent, patient and environment; perhaps including the agent's intentions, the patient's sensitivities, etc. But, I conjecture, at no point in this chain of explanatory relations will we meet the fact that the act is cruel. The closest connection we might find will be that the cruelty of the act and the way the act looks have a common explanation, in the above cited intentions and sensitivities. But this in no way supports the claim that there exists an explanatory relation between them, no more than does the fact that the rising barometer and coming storm have a common explanation support the contention that the rising of the barometer explains the coming of the storm. If this is right, value recognition will not satisfy a plausible necessary condition on perceptual knowledge.
To this is might be responded that I have wrongly assumed that the way that the act looks consists in its basic visible properties (shapes, colours, etc.) rather than 13 This condition incorporates into the account of perceptual knowledge something every much like one element of Dretske's (1969) To answer this objection in a satisfactory way would be a significant undertaking, but let me just sketch my answer. I agree that there is a case to be made for such 'high level' looks as looking happy (Smith, 2013) . I do not think, however, that they will include looking cruel among their number. Any plausible account of high level looks ought to accept that an object possesses such a look in virtue of possessing various low level looks. That is, a person looks happy in virtue of the way their mouth and eyes, for example, look; an action looks cruel in virtue of the ways in which its agent, patient and environment look; and so on. If this is right, and supposing this 'in virtue of' to be explanatory in the relevant sense, then the move to such high level looks achieves nothing. It will still be the case that, in order for the way that the act looks to be explained by its being cruel, it must be that the low level ways it looks must be so explained. And this is exactly what I have suggested is implausible. For this reason, the present account of perceptual knowledge will not support the contention that some of our knowledge of evaluative facts is perceptual.
Culture and context
Unfortunately for the perceptual account of emotion recognition outlined in §2, there is growing empirically grounded scepticism towards the Neurocultural view.
Furthermore, empirical work threatens not only the theory but also those aspects of common-sense that lend support to DL e and RC e , including the view that the explanatory connection proposed in §4 is satisfied. 16 In the present section I outline and, by way of amending both DL e and RC e , respond to this empirical challenge. 15 Whilst both Millar (2000) and Goldie (2007) are sympathetic to the idea that some cases of value recognition are perceptual, neither would endorse this claim.
16 Much of the research described in this section relies on attributions of emotional state based on a combination of emotional elicitors and self-report. One might worry that, for a variety of reasons, both are unreliable. Whilst I have some sympathy with
Cultural variation in emotion expression and recognition
There now exist serious challenges to the claim that basic emotions have pan-cultural expressions that are universally recognised. This claim has typically been supported by cross-cultural matching studies that have found subjects from a variety of cultures to match pictures of stereotypical facial expressions with the predicted basic emotions (e.g. Ekman & Friesen 1971) . It is helpful to distinguish two distinct claims: first, that certain distinct facial expressions are universally produced by the basic emotions, second that these facial expressions are universally recognised as so produced. The most obvious conclusion to draw from this empirical work is that emotion production and recognition vary with culture. This does not directly challenge DL e . this concern, for the present purposes I will take the research at face value. We should, of course, be cautious not to overstate any conclusions we might draw from it. ' (2010: 167-168) case, we are at liberty to interpret 'round here' as meaning 'within our culture'. The resulting account of emotion recognition will be explicitly culture specific, but it will be no less perceptual for that.
Scepticism about emotional expression
Even if the universality claim is dropped, a recognisable variant of the Neurocultural view would maintain that, at least within certain cultures, there are basic emotions that produce stereotypical facial expressions. This, along with the assumption that such facial expressions are not, at least to any great extent, produced by any other, non-emotional means, would support the claim that within cultures some emotions have distinctive looks. These more limited claims have, however, been subject to various challenges. At the most radical, Fridlund (1994; (Fridlund 1994: 130) . 18 On this view, it is not emotional factors but rather 'social motives' that determine emotional expression. Obviously, if true, this would undermine both DL e and RC e .
However, Fridlund's evolutionary case is less than compelling. To begin with, 'being beneficial' is not the same as 'serving motives'. Since I can be wrong about my environment, something can benefit me in unexpected ways. This is a point familiar from debates on the nature of well-being, and the standard reason for rejecting the crudest preference satisfaction accounts. Thus it may be that 18 For a related view from the philosophical literature, see (Griffiths 2003 There is also some evidence against Fridlund's claim that expressions are never or rarely indicative of emotions. As mentioned above, and as Fridlund (1994) accepts, it is plausible that the production and recognition of facial expressions have co-evolved. Thus, it would be surprising, so in need of explanation, if facial expressions have evolved to express social motives without being typically recognised as such. It is evidence against Fridlund's view, then, that emotion, not social message, is overwhelmingly attributed on the basis of facial expression (Horstmann 2003) . 19 Whilst these considerations are obviously not conclusive, I will nevertheless treat them as reason enough to set aside the challenge to DL e and RC e posed by Fridlund's Behavioural Ecology view. (Fridlund 1994: 145) . This suggests a moderate line according to which facial expressions are sometimes produced by emotions, sometimes by social factors, perhaps more often by a combination of the two. In fact there is evidence that in naturalistic settings contextual, predominantly social, factors 19 Indeed, the fact that people do take expressive behaviour to be produced by emotion, suggests that there will develop a practise of using stereotypical facial expressions to communicate their emotional states, even if that expressive behaviour is not automatic (Parkinson, et al., 2005: 169) . 20 For a philosophical attempt to combine elements of Fridland's and Ekman's positions, see (Green 2007: Ch.5) . First, a number of naturalistic studies report weak correlations between emotion (as determined by the emotion-eliciting context or by self-report) and predicted facial expression. For example, subjects experiencing surprise do not tend to display the stereotypical surprise expression (Schützwohl & Reisenzein 2012) , nor do subjects self-reporting even intense joy tend to display Duchenne smiles (Reisenzein et al., 2013) . Further, naturalistic studies of bowlers, athletes and football fans, all in joy-eliciting situations, indicate that many smiles occur at socially interactive moments, but very few occur during non-interactive periods, despite no self-reported change in emotional intensity (see Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda 1997; and
Fernández-Dols & Crivelli 2013 for discussion). This is the so-called 'audience effect' on facial expression.
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As interesting as these studies are, they do not directly challenge the present account of emotion recognition. What they challenge is, once more, the claim that certain emotions have characteristic looks, but that is no part of the account. The falsity, for example, of the claim that most joyous people smile, is not of immediate concern. For we can accept this whilst nevertheless maintaining that there is some way of looking such that most people looking that way are joyous.
Potentially more troublingly, a pair of recent studies have shown that people display more Duchenne smiles when engaging in a cooperative task than when engaging in a task that is non-cooperative. Whilst being on the receiving end of such cooperative Duchenne smiles increases one's self-reported joy, these studies showed no robust correlation between the expresser's own happiness and Duchenne smiling (Mehu et al., 2013; Mehu et al., 2007) . This, it would seem, motivates the thought that, 'the Duchenne marker could advertise altruistic intentions' (Mehu et al., 2013: 421) which, in turn, suggests that, far from being distinctive of joy, the Duchenne smile is distinctive of something else, the desire to cooperate or, to put it another way, friendliness. 21 The audience effect, whilst undeniable, cannot plausibly explain all the data, since there is evidence that, in fact, subjects pull more 'sad' faces when alone (Jakobs, et al., 2001 shows. In fact, there is indeed evidence that Duchenne smiles are, as one would expect, correlated with (comic) amusement (Reisenzein et al., 2013) . Amusement is not the same as joy. Amusement, we might say, is an appropriate response to the funny, whereas joy is an appropriate response to things going well (for one).
However, the above indicates that we should be careful not to suppose that the evidence supports the claim that there are no contexts in which most people displaying a Duchenne smile are doing so because they are joyous.
Despite these caveats, it remains that we have here a serious challenge to the bare claim that most people 'round here' that look the way associated with displaying a Duchenne smile do so because they are joyous, or friendly, or amused.
Contextual influence on emotion attribution
Not only does context affect the facial expressions we make, it also affects the emotion that observers are disposed to attribute to expressers and does so in two ways. First, the context in which the expresser is observed plays a role in the emotion attributed. Second, the context in which the observation and attribution is made can play a similar role. 23 Since Lev Kuleshov's famous experiment in the early Twentieth 22 See (Mehu et al., 2007) for evidence relevant to RC e formulated for friendliness. 23 There are also intermediate cases, a good example being film music, which affects emotion attribution whilst occupying an ambiguous position between the context of the actor and that of the viewer. Such cases are very interesting, however for Century, filmmakers have known that editing technique can imbue a neutral face with emotional content (see Wallbott 1988; Mobbs et al., 2006) . The same face can, when cut with different shots, seem either caring or lusty, for example. 24 That is, the context in which someone appears, whether that context be at a time, as with still pictures, or over time, as is made possible by film, has an effect on the emotional state observers are disposed to attribute.
The second way in which context affects attribution is perhaps less familiar but is no less significant. It has been found that, in the lab, the likelihood of a face being judged as either disgusted or angry varies with previous faces seen (Yik et al., 2013) . That is, a face displaying the characteristic disgust expression is much more likely to be judged as a disgust face if the observer has previously seen an angry face;
otherwise it is more likely to be judged as an anger face. This effect concerns not the context of the face seen, but the observational context of the attributor.
On the assumption that these varying contexts do not have the effect of literally changing how the perceived person/face looks, these studies challenge RC e .
For what they suggest is that competent observers may lack a stable disposition to judge those looking l to be e. Our dispositions are, rather, blown by the winds of context.
Distinctive looks, recognitional capacities and context
We have then, a series of empirical challenges to the perceptual account of emotion recognition outlined in §2. Whilst cultural variation can be accommodated by a 'round here' clause, this is not so for the effects of 'local' context on expression and recognition. A defender of the perceptual account of emotion recognition must show how it is consistent with these empirical studies. This can be done by incorporating a contextual element into both DL e and RC e . simplicity I set them aside. The distinction in the text between the context of the expresser and that of the observer is, in some respects, artificial but this is harmless for present purposes. 24 Alfred Hitchock presents this example in his well-known 'definition of happiness' interview, during his description of what he there calls 'pure cinematics'. DL e claims that for some emotion type e there is a look, l, such that (round here) most people that look l do so because they are e. The particular example I have been using is the look associated with the display of a Duchenne smile. The worry is that contrary to a common-sense understanding of the relation between joy and smiling this look is not, in fact, distinctive of joy.
If context plays such a role in both the production of expressive behaviour and the attribution of emotional states to others on the basis of their expressive behaviour, then the account must be adjusted to allow for this. The most obvious way to achieve this would be along the following lines: There remains, however, a worry. For the evidence concerning the effect of the perceiver's context on attribution might be taken to show that perceivers, in fact, lack the stable dispositions to attribute emotions based on looks in contexts that RC e * requires. If our disposition to attribute a given emotional state to a subject depends on the order in which faces have been presented (Yik et al., 2013) , then it would seem that our emotion attributions may be subject to systematic variation not matched on the objective side (i.e. by the relation between emotions and looks). This, it might be insisted, is not answered by the above incorporation of context into the perceptual account, since the relevant context is that of the attributor not the attributee. This is not a serious concern, however. In fact, the explicit inclusion of context into DL e * and RC e * does significantly answer this empirical worry, for the study in question concerns the attribution of emotional states to contextlessly presented faces. What the study suggests is that when presented with a context-free face, our attribution of emotion to it can vary according to our own context. What the study does not show is that the same is true of faces presented in emotion-relevant contexts. For example, the study gives us no reason to suppose that our attribution of friendliness to a person exhibiting a Duchenne smile in a cooperative situation so varies.
Conclusion
The simple perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition presented by Goldie, and drawing on Millar, rely on there being stable, explanatory connections between emotions/values, looks, and recognitional capacities. In §4 I argued that the explanatory condition presents a problem for the account of value recognition. Since actions do not look as they do because they instantiate value properties, there is some reason to think that we cannot use the present account of perceptual knowledge as an account of value recognition. In §5 I raised a different worry for the account of emotion recognition. Whilst the account sits well with the neuro-cultural view of emotional expression, there is some reason to doubt that view. Recent empirical work on emotional expression suggests that the relations between emotional states, on the one hand, and expressive behaviour are not as tight as the neuro-cultural view might lead us to suppose. The perceptual account can, however, be defended by incorporating both locality and context into its two principle claims. Despite the various effects of context on emotional expression and recognition, it still seems plausible that some of our knowledge of others' emotional states is genuinely perceptual.
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